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A	health	intelligence	framework	for	pandemic
response:	lessons	from	the	UK	experience	of	COVID-
19
COVID-19	has	exposed	critical	failures	in	global	public	policy	preparedness	and	response.
The	UK’s	response	in	particular	is	an	archetype	of	how	the	pandemic	has	overwhelmed
traditional	public	health-led	approaches.	Gemma	Bowsher	argues	that	pandemics	are
multivector	threats	meriting	attention	within	a	health	intelligence	framework.
COVID-19	continues	to	reveal	shortcomings	in	the	day-to-day	operational	function	of
governments	responding	to	crises	of	various	kinds.	The	so-called	‘health	security’	community
has	long	argued	for	greater	alignment	of	national	and	sub-national	health	functions	with	the
apparatus	of	the	security	sector.	Following	9/11,	the	US	anthrax	attacks	soon	after,	and	the	quickly	following	SARS
epidemic,	global	governance	actors	spoke	readily	of	the	need	to	consider	health	and	security	as	flipsides	of	a	coin.
Over	the	ensuing	period,	however,	expertise	in	the	security	sector	regarding	natural	and	intentional	biological
threats	has	declined,	and	so	has	political	interest	in	making	concrete	steps	towards	building	institutional	frameworks
in	government.
Notably,	Barack	Obama,	whilst	still	a	junior	senator,	wrote	in	the	New	York	Times	of	the	need	to	consider	health
within	the	threat	matrices	of	national	security,	and	the	evidence	of	renewed	attention	appeared	during	the	2014-16
Ebola	epidemic,	again	during	the	Zika	epidemic,	and	most	recently	of	course,	the	COVID-19	pandemic.	The	UK
government’s	biological	security	strategy,	published	in	2018,	explicitly	notes	the	need	to	harness	the	capabilities	of
the	intelligence	sector	to	address	the	growth	in	biothreat	concerns	across	the	naturally	occurring	and	deliberately
engineered	spectrum.	The	objectives	of	this	strategy	were	ultimately	side-lined	due	to	Brexit,	but	nevertheless	the
findings	have	been	thrown	into	sharp	focus	during	the	unfolding	pandemic.
The	history	of	forgotten	proclamations	in	this	arena	is	not	confined	to	the	UK	–	in	2004,	the	Canadian	Government
released	its	national	security	policy,	including	a	chapter	on	‘Public	Health	Emergencies’,	which	outlined	a	clear
commitment	to	integrate	public	health	within	national	security	policy.	The	major	product	of	this	strategy	was	the
establishment	of	the	Global	Public	Health	Intelligence	Network,	a	surveillance	system	providing	early	warning
indicators	of	biological	threats.	This	system	is	an	extremely	powerful	tool	for	the	early	identification	of	potential
disease	outbreaks	of	significance;	however,	its	focus	on	outbreak	detection	alone	reflects	the	general	focus	of
governments	such	as	the	UK’s	on	monitoring	relatively	narrow	epidemiological	indicators,	which	are	then	directed
into	further	epidemiological	modelling.	This	approach	is	clearly	a	vital	component	of	national	outbreak	responses,
but	the	UK	has	demonstrated	the	hazards	associated	with	over-reliance	on	modelling	at	the	expense	of	a	multi-
vector	framework	integrating	an	all-source	approach.
In	a	recent	paper	exploring	the	UK’s	COVID-19	response,	my	colleagues	and	I	propose	a	framework	to	approach
health	intelligence	in	a	systematic	manner,	expanding	the	terms	beyond	public	health	domains.	Using	the
framework	of	the	intelligence	cycle	–		direction,	collection,	analysis,	production,	dissemination	–	we	offer	a	skeleton
upon	which	to	build	a	pandemic	response	protocol	that	incorporates	systematic	processes	and	informational
sources	from	public	health,	clinical	settings,	political,	commercial,	economic	and	security	sources	to	build	a	detailed
intelligence	product	more	reflective	of	the	array	dependencies	arising	from	the	health	event	of	concern.	This	tool	is
applicable	to	naturally	occurring	outbreaks	such	as	COVID-19,	hostile	events	such	as	bioweapons	attacks,	or	even
events	of	broad	health	consequence	for	domestic	populations,	such	as	natural	disasters.	The	newly-established
Joint	Biosecurity	Centre	is	no	doubt	intended	to	fulfil	some	of	these	functions,	in	the	same	manner	as	the	Joint
Terrorism	Analysis	Centre,	yet	it	remains	to	be	seen	beyond	the	pandemic	how	the	functioning	of	this	centre	will
effectively	bridge	the	gap	between	health	and	security	actors	in	the	UK	sphere.
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Managing	uncertainty	amidst	the	constraints	of	an	emerging	pandemic	is	a	serious	challenge,	and	the	need	for
proven	institutional	capacity	has	never	been	greater.	Settings	that	have	done	well	have	employed	a	systematic
approach	from	the	start.	South	Korea	and	Singapore,	for	example,	demonstrate	the	value	of	pre-established	health
emergencies	planning	with	coordinated	processes	for	managing	information	pathways	before	crisis	strikes.	These
states	have	shown	the	importance	of	learning	lessons	from	previous	outbreaks	–	MERS	and	SARS	–	as	well	as
maintaining	high	levels	of	situational	awareness	of	unique	geographic	and	geo-political	concerns	with	potential	to
amplify	harm,	as	well	as	producing	opportunities	to	deliver	early	and	effective	responses.	The	importance	of
developing	context-led	systems	cannot	be	overstated.	As	tempting	as	it	is	to	use	one	country’s	successes	as	a
template	for	another’s	future	practice,	parsing	interventions	with	local	requirements	should	instead	be	the	critical
focus.	For	example,	the	relative	uptake	of	contact-tracing	app	technology	in	Australia	or	Singapore	versus	the	UK,
highlights	the	need	for	local	intelligence	to	determine	the	direction	of	interventions	from	the	earliest	stage	of	action.
Of	course,	advocating	for	an	intelligence-led	approach	to	pandemics	opens	up	pathways	for	criticism.	There	have
been	long	and	heated	debates	regarding	the	appropriateness	of	health	actors	working	closely	with	security	actors,
or	appearing	aligned	with	security	sector	interests.	These	criticisms	are	rational	and	merit	proper	attention.
However,	as	the	health	crisis	of	COVID-19	has	been	thrust	to	the	centre	of	global	attention,	the	failures	of	nation
states	and	political	structures	to	handle	this	unfamiliar	threat	makes	stark	the	neglect	of	health	concerns	within
broader	governance	approaches.	It	is	certain	that	the	control	of	public	health	will	be	drawn	closer	to	the	operations
of	central	government	and	international	governance	actors	in	ways	we	could	not	have	predicted	at	the	outset	of
2020.	This	approach	is	intended	to	support	the	work	of	the	science	and	public	health	communities	working	to
develop	the	critical	knowledge	necessary	to	develop	treatments	and	vaccines	during	unfolding	crises.	Introducing
systems	of	analysis	such	as	intelligence	methods	offers	one	way	to	manage	uncertainty	in	a	robust,	evidence-led
manner	that	is	subject	to	oversight.	Without	active	thought	and	sustained	attention,	the	UK	and	other	nations	risk
repeating	the	failures	of	COVID-19	–	the	imperative	to	improve	has	never	been	greater.
_____________________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	co-authored	work	in	Health	Security.
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